Security | Threat Detection | Cyberattacks | DevSecOps | Compliance

It’s not a secret that phishing, stolen credentials, and human error remain some of the easiest ways for attackers to get into an environment. Identity has become one of the biggest attack surfaces for organizations today because sometimes, all an attacker needs to do is log in. That access can come from valid credentials, stolen sessions, exposed tokens, compromised service accounts, or abused application permissions.

Most people don't hesitate to run a free security scan because they doubt it'll find anything. They hesitate because they don't know what the results will look like. Will it be 40 pages of raw data without context? A sales pitch disguised as a report? We'll walk through it screen by screen so you know exactly what to expect before entering a domain.

That human review becomes a bottleneck as agents scale is now widely observed. Five or ten agents working in parallel produce more decisions than one reviewer can evaluate, and under queue pressure the review degrades into approval without examination. ‍ The usual response is to move up a level, reviewing intents and boundaries rather than individual outputs.

The OWASP GenAI Security Project unveiled an Agent Control Standard in early September, donated to the project and aimed at runtime enforcement for agentic systems. It sets out that agents should be inspectable, traceable and instrumentable, with declarative hooks and policy enforcement across frameworks. ‍ It answers which controls belong around an agent.

Insurers are subject to AI governance rules and they are also the party asking other organizations AI governance questions as a condition of coverage. More than twenty states have adopted the model bulletin that turns AI oversight into an operational requirement for carriers, and those same carriers now send AI questionnaires to their corporate insureds. ‍ The sector facing both is well covered. What follows from it is not, and it produces something an insured can use. ‍

An AI product sold in Europe is described as facing two incident reporting duties. One under product security rules and one under AI rules, with different triggers and different deadlines. ‍ Only one of them is running. Article 14 of the Cyber Resilience Act has applied since 11 September 2026. The AI duty moved, and coverage published in the last few weeks still describes it as live. ‍

Somebody in operations builds an automation inside a sanctioned platform to solve a problem in their own workflow. It works, other people come to depend on its output, and eighteen months later that person leaves. ‍ The platform still lists the automation. Nobody inherits it, because it was never anybody's asset to begin with, and the offboarding checklist has no line for a thing that was never recorded as belonging to the person departing. ‍