Security | Threat Detection | Cyberattacks | DevSecOps | Compliance

In March 2026, researchers began linking a series of software supply-chain compromises to Replicating Marauder, the BlueVoyant Threat Fusion Cell (TFC) primary identifier for the actor publicly tracked elsewhere as TeamPCP. What made the campaign stand out was that trusted software was poisoned and one compromise repeatedly appeared to enable the next by exposing credentials, release paths, or Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery or Deployment (CI/CD) trust relationships.

Recently, JUMPSEC’s DART (Detection and Response Team) detected a phishing email targeting a client environment. The email, written in Thai and containing a MediaFire download link, was identified as suspicious by an incident responder and we kicked off an investigation. Since then, we have established infrastructure to track the threat actor, analysed the novel payload in detail, and identified several IoCs below.

Most malware analysis workflows follow the same pattern: run a set of tools, manually review the output, build detection rules from memory, and repeat. It's reliable, but slow, and for MDR and MSSP teams handling volume, delays have a cost. In this workshop, LimaCharlie Senior Solutions Engineer Chris Botelho demonstrates a faster path: using Claude Code with LimaCharlie's reverse engineering environment to triage, analyze, and build detections against a real malware sample pulled from Malware Bazaar.

Ransomware has moved beyond simple malware attacks. It is now operating under a structured business model that disrupts operations, not just systems. Attackers are not depending on phishing or malicious files to deploy ransomware. They instead use compromised identities and existing tools present within environments to move undetected. By the time encryption starts, the attack has already progressed across systems.

SophosLabs analysts investigated WantToCry ransomware attacks that involved the threat actors abusing the Server Message Block (SMB) service for initial access and then exfiltrating files to attacker-controlled infrastructure for remote encryption. The detection surface is significantly reduced because WantToCry operates without local malware execution, and there is no post-compromise activity beyond exfiltrating files and rewriting them to disk.

An active supply chain attack has compromised 323 npm packages published under the atool npm maintainer account. The wave sweeps the entire @antv data-visualization organization alongside standalone libraries with wide independent adoption: echarts-for-react, timeago.js, size-sensor, and canvas-nest.js. With echarts-for-react pulling roughly 1.1 million weekly downloads, any project that auto-updates these packages is in scope.

Securonix Threat Research tracks TAX#TRIDENT, an active fake Indian Income Tax-themed campaign that uses three delivery paths to reach Windows endpoints. The campaign starts with fake tax assessment lures and then moves victims toward ZIP files, VBScript downloaders, or PHP-looking web endpoints that actually return script content.