Security | Threat Detection | Cyberattacks | DevSecOps | Compliance

An agent breaks in production. Who's accountable?

We asked eight security and product leaders who's accountable when an agent ships to production and breaks something. Nobody said the model. Harish Gaggar named the reason. An agent runs on permissions someone approved and configuration someone set. Ron Reiter drew the line in the same place, accountability sits with whoever decided what the agent could actually do. As agents act across more systems, the accountability trail gets harder to follow. Most teams cannot determine which human granted an agent access.

ISO 42001 Evidence: What Auditors Ask For

ISO 42001 is the management system standard for artificial intelligence. It sits on the backbone of ISO 27001 but with a different focus: do you have a system for governing AI, and can you prove that system runs, with evidence? Core to the standard is an Artificial Intelligence Management System (AIMS), a structured set of policies, processes, and controls an organization uses to govern AI.

What tasks should AI take over?

What part of your profession do you hope AI takes over? What should it never touch? Security practitioners and technology leaders landed in the same place: hand off the tedious work, and keep human judgment on anything that affects blast radius. That's the skills reckoning. As AI absorbs the repetitive work, the expertise that decides what an agent is allowed to reach becomes more valuable.

Hot Take: Over-permissioned agents will be the next big breach.

The next big breach won't be a hacker. It'll be an over-permissioned agent. Someone approved an agent action at some point, for a reason that made sense at the time. But access persisted long after a task was performed. Stale permissions without human intervention could turn into exposure. Listen to perspectives from people who see this problem from different roles.
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Identity Everywhere: Bringing Infrastructure Identity to Agentic IT

Every era of computing eventually exposes the assumptions that made the last era work. For decades, networking succeeded because it was mostly identity agnostic. Packets moved because they had addresses. Routers and switches forwarded traffic because the network knew where something was going, not necessarily who or what was behind it. That model helped build the internet and modern enterprises. But it is not enough for the era we are entering now.

Identity Everywhere: Bringing Infrastructure Identity to Agentic IT

Cisco and Teleport are announcing a strategic partnership centered on deep technology integration, licensing, and investment. As the largest strategic investor, Cisco is reinforcing its commitment to accelerating the next phase of Teleport's evolution.

We Had 13 Engineers Spend Three Months Finding Vulnerabilities with LLMs

Blame for all flaws belongs to the flawed human author. Historically, the bottleneck for finding security bugs in software was human bandwidth. As pointed out in this great post by Tom Ptacek, it appears that large language models are exceptionally good at finding them with simple prompting. This adds substantial bandwidth to the effort of finding bugs.

How to Prevent RBAC Role Explosion with Nested Access Lists

In RBAC (Role-based Access Control), a role is a defined object with explicit permissions attached to it. Because roles are designed to be fixed, changing what a particular role can do (for example, in a one-off situation where other permissions are needed for the role) requires editing the role itself. However, repeatedly editing roles makes them less flexible and re-usable, and ultimately complicates access strategies as organizations scale.