CrowdStrike is excited to announce we have been named a leader in Frost & Sullivan’s Cloud Workload Protection Platform (CWPP) Radar for the second consecutive year. This recognition validates our continued innovation and growth in cloud security and our commitment to providing a unified cloud security approach and powerful workload security capabilities.

Securing the cloud has become increasingly complex as organizations adopt hybrid and multi-cloud resources to meet their demanding business requirements. It’s also more crucial than ever: From 2022 to 2023, CrowdStrike identified a 75% increase in cloud intrusions.

As modern cyberattacks increasingly target cloud environments, it is imperative organizations have the technology they need to detect and stop them. The attack surface of cloud-native applications and infrastructure is quickly expanding. Cloud-native application protection platforms (CNAPPs) address the growing need for modern cloud security monitoring, security posture management, breach prevention and control tools to fully protect cloud environments.

In today’s rapidly evolving threat landscape, the need for dynamic security measures is critical. Due to Windows’s current architecture and design, security products running in the platform, particularly those involved in endpoint protection, require kernel access to provide the highest level of visibility, enforcement and tamper-resistance, while meeting the strict performance envelopes demanded by large enterprise clients.

CrowdStrike is aware of inaccurate reporting and false claims about the security of the Falcon sensor. This blog sets the record straight by providing customers with accurate technical information about the Falcon sensor and any claims regarding the Channel File 291 incident. CrowdStrike has provided a Technical Root Cause Analysis and executive summary that describes the bug in detail.

On July 24, 2024, an unattributed threat actor distributed a password-protected installer masquerading as an inauthentic Falcon Crash Reporter Installer to a German entity in an unattributed spear-phishing attempt. Subsequent analysis revealed that executing the installer with the threat actor-provided password leads to a novel execution chain in which an agent written to the Mythic command-and-control (C2)1 framework is executed as LLVM Intermediate Representation (IR) bitcode.

On July 24, 2024, hacktivist entity USDoD claimed on English-language cybercrime forum BreachForums to have leaked CrowdStrike’s “entire threat actor list.”1 The actor also alleged that they had obtained CrowdStrike’s “entire IOC list” and would release it “soon.” In the announcement, USDoD provided a link to download the alleged threat actor list and provided a sample of data fields, likely in an effort to substantiate their claims.