Security | Threat Detection | Cyberattacks | DevSecOps | Compliance

A vendor can bypass MFA and sign in with an individual account while still being able to reach industrial systems unrelated to the job. Before replacing your current setup, follow one real service request from approval through completion. The exercise can reveal outdated permissions, unnecessary network connectivity, shared credentials, or records that are difficult to retrieve when you need them.

Written by Bill Moore, CEO & Founder TL;DR In Part 1 of this series, I looked at how computing and telecommunications gradually became what we now call Enterprise IT. That change did not happen because someone decided to merge two departments. It happened because the technologies, the systems, and the work they supported became too interconnected to describe separately.

There was a time when “Information Technology” wasn’t a department, an industry, or even a common business term. In the 1970s and 1980s, computing and telecommunications were largely separate disciplines. Computers processed information. Telecommunications moved information. Most systems operated independently, often serving specific departments or business functions. Then those worlds began to converge. Organizations started connecting computers through networks.

In late July 2026, over 30 municipal water systems across Minnesota were targeted in coordinated cyber attacks that disrupted the Operational Technology (OT) used to remotely monitor and control water equipment. The attacks initially unfolded on July 26 and 27, striking multiple automated control systems across the state, including those in Plymouth, Braham and South St. Paul.

A ransomware advisory lands in your inbox before the morning standup, and the room goes quiet. The water utility's firewall logs are in one console, the endpoint alerts are in another, and the OT sensor feed lives somewhere else entirely. Everyone can see a piece of the story, but no one can see the whole incident. That's the part teams feel first. Not the theory, not the policy language, just the blunt realization that point tools don't become a program on their own.

Electricity supports nearly every function of modern life: hospitals, water systems, transportation, communications, emergency services, financial systems, manufacturing, national defense, and, most importantly, streaming services. Kidding, but our most critical systems run on electricity, and that makes us vulnerable to attacks.

For oil and gas operators, operational technology (OT) is a lifeline, sometimes literally. OT systems are essential to maintaining not just reliable and efficient operations but also safe environments for workers. In upstream production sites, offshore platforms, pipelines, terminals and refineries, critical processes depend on a complex network of OT assets that organizations use to control and optimize operations. Cybersecurity programs for OT often focus heavily on prevention.

Picture Singapore’s largest telecommunications network. It carries the financial transactions, emergency communications, and government data of a city-state of nearly six million people. Now picture that infrastructure silently infiltrated for months by a state-linked espionage group, undetected until the telcos’ own security teams found it.

As cyber threats targeting critical infrastructure continue to evolve, the energy sector remains a prime target for malicious actors. Protecting the electric grid requires a strong regulatory framework and robust cybersecurity monitoring practices. In the United States, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) play key roles in safeguarding the power system against cyber risks.

Are the repeated warnings throughout the years taking effect? Although we would like to say they are, the answer is complex and, most likely, we aren’t quite there yet.