Hosting phishing pages or malicious payloads on legitimate cloud services is now a consolidated modus operandi for bad actors.
When you think about your DLP approach, what immediately comes to mind? Is it primarily centered around compliance? Is it simply using vendor-provided patterns of interest to satisfy an industry-specific framework like PCI, PII, or GDPR? Chances are, this probably describes at least some part of your DLP strategy because it is not difficult to set up and can satisfy a key business requirement of regulatory compliance reporting.
Best practices for securing an AWS environment have been well-documented and generally accepted, such as AWS’s guidance. However, organizations may still find it challenging on how to begin applying this guidance to their specific environments. In this blog series, we’ll analyze anonymized data from Netskope customers that include security settings of 650,000 entities from 1,143 AWS accounts across several hundred organizations.
Malicious Microsoft Office documents are a popular vehicle for malware distribution. Many malware families such as Emotet, IcedID, and Dridex abuse Office documents as their primary distribution mechanism. Attackers have long used phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Office documents, often hosted in popular cloud apps like Box and Amazon S3 to increase the chances of a successful lure. The techniques being used with Office documents are continuing to evolve.
Over the last year, we’ve made tremendous progress expanding NewEdge to provide Netskope customers with the global coverage they demand. We have real, full-compute data centers in nearly 50 regions today and plans to go live with our Lima, Peru data center in early October (which will be our fifth in Latin America).
Co-authored by James Robinson and Jeff Kessler As rapidly as wide-area networking (WAN) and remote access strategies with associated technologies are changing, we’re always surprised by the amount of time some security professionals and auditors dedicate to the either/or debate between split tunnel and full tunnel connectivity.
In our recent blog, Who Do You Trust? OAuth Client Application Trends, we took a look at which OAuth applications were being trusted in a large dataset of anonymized Netskope customers, as well as raised some ideas of how to evaluate the risk involved based on the scopes requested and the number of users involved. One of the looming questions that underlies assessing your application risk is: How does one identify applications? How do you know which application is which? Who is the owner/developer?
