Security | Threat Detection | Cyberattacks | DevSecOps | Compliance

June 10th, we announced a critical vulnerability in phpBB that lets attackers bypass authentication, now known as CVE-2026-48611. This post is a follow-up, containing technical details that explain exploit scenarios and detection methods. To get you up to speed, phpBB is an old forum software that's still being used today by various technical communities. phpBB's Site Showcase alone has over 6 million members.

Brand impersonation and account takeover (ATO) are often treated as separate security problems. One is viewed as a phishing or brand abuse issue. The other is viewed as an authentication or fraud issue. Attackers often see them differently. Many ATO attacks begin long before a login attempt appears on a dashboard. They begin when a customer encounters a fake website, fraudulent search result, impersonating social media profile, cloned mobile app, or spoofed communication that appears legitimate.

You're probably in one of two situations right now. Either an auditor has asked for proof that your controls operate, or your SOC is collecting plenty of telemetry but nobody can cleanly map that activity back to NIST 800-53 controls. Both problems usually come from the same gap. The framework lives in policy binders, while the evidence lives in scattered tools. That gap gets painful fast in FedRAMP, CMMC-aligned, and other regulated environments.

Enterprises are standing up AI application frameworks like Langflow faster than security teams can review them. These platforms let teams build and automate generative AI workflows in days instead of months, but that speed comes with a cost: many instances go live with default settings, get exposed to the internet, and never make it onto a security team’s radar. CVE-2026-33017 shows exactly what happens next.

Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS) sits at the center of finance, procurement, and payment operations for many large enterprises. When a critical vulnerability surfaces in a module like Oracle Payments, the impact reaches well past IT. It touches financial data, transaction integrity, and regulatory exposure. CVE-2026-46817 is exactly that kind of vulnerability, and it is now being actively exploited.

The INC ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation has grown into one of the premier ransomware offerings, claiming hundreds of victims in 2026 alone, according to researchers at Acronis. The attackers target a broad range of industries, but have recently prioritized entities in the legal sector.

GDPR compliance for small businesses means having a documented, evidence-based process for how you collect, use, store, and delete the personal data of EU residents — regardless of your company’s size, revenue, or location. This guide walks through all ten compliance domains regulators expect you to have covered: data mapping, lawful basis, privacy notices, data subject rights, privacy by design, retention, vendors, transfers, breach response, and governance.

As organizations move more workloads to cloud infrastructure, questions about where data is stored and who controls it are becoming more important. Two terms often appear in these discussions: data residency and data sovereignty. They are related, but they do not mean the same thing. For service providers, understanding the difference is critical. Clients in regulated sectors increasingly ask for infrastructure that can support compliance, jurisdictional control and local hosting requirements.

Higher education institutions don’t run on a single vendor ecosystem. They run on dozens of overlapping ones. Teaching, research, identity, payments, student services, cloud infrastructure, alumni engagement, and campus operations all rely on different third-party vendors. These often enter the institution through departments and administrative teams before InfoSec becomes aware of them. This is the operational reality that higher education TPRM software addresses.

Higher education institutions are the most targeted sector for cyberattacks. Yet the teams responsible for managing that risk often face a structural disadvantage: they’re accountable for a vendor ecosystem they can’t fully see. Academic autonomy and the scale of university operations mean that vendors enter the institution through departments, research groups, and administrative teams before InfoSec has full visibility. This challenge is built into how higher education operates.