Red Hat® OpenShift® Container Platform (OCP) is an enterprise-grade Kubernetes platform for building, deploying, running, and managing containerized applications in a hybrid world. The reality is that with Red Hat OCP, building, deploying, running, and managing containerized workloads couldn’t be any easier.
When David McCheyne, DevOps Engineer at Datto, outlined a plan to ease the company into developer-first security using Snyk, he thought it would take his teams a year to prove the concept. A seasoned DevOps pro, David understood very well the enormity of this change and was prepared to slowly introduce Datto security champions to the Snyk platform and not force the process.
On November 1st, 2021, a public disclosure of a paper titled Trojan Source: Invisible Vulnerabilities described how malicious actors may employ unicode-based bidirectional control characters to slip malicious source code into an otherwise benign codebase. This attack relies on reviewers confusing the obfuscated malicious source code with comments.
Embedded devices with limited memory and storage resources are likely to leverage a tool such as BusyBox, which is marketed as the Swiss Army Knife of embedded Linux. BusyBox is a software suite of many useful Unix utilities, known as applets, that are packaged as a single executable file. Within BusyBox you can find a full-fledged shell, a DHCP client/server, and small utilities such as cp, ls, grep, and others.
Over the last few years, the term DevOps and DevSecOps (which stand for Developer Operations and Developer Security Operations respectively) have become synonymous with companies trying to become more agile and less monolithic.
In a previous blog post, we showed how type manipulation (or type confusion) can be used to escape template sandboxes, leading to cross-site scripting (XSS) or code injection vulnerabilities. One of the main goals for this research was to explore (in the JavaScript ecosystem) how and if it is possible to bypass some security fixes or input validations with a type confusion attack (i.e by providing an unexpected input type).
Most container images are built using Dockerfiles which contain combinations of instructions like FROM, RUN, COPY, ENTRYPOINT, etc. to build the layers of an OCI-compliant image. One instruction that is used surprisingly rarely, though, is LABEL. In this post, we’ll dig into labels (“annotations” in the OCI Image Specification) what they are, some standardized uses as well as some practices you can use to enhance your container security posture.
