Security | Threat Detection | Cyberattacks | DevSecOps | Compliance

How likely is a man-in-the-middle attack?

Security vendors love the man-in-the-middle attack. It’s the boogeyman of every TLS marketing page. Some shadowy figure intercepting your traffic, reading your secrets, stealing your data. A man-in-the-middle attack is when an attacker positions themselves between two parties on a network to intercept the traffic flowing between them. In the context of TLS, that means an attacker who can present a valid certificate can read everything in plaintext and proxy it on to the real server.

BygoneSSL happened to us

A few months ago I wrote about BygoneSSL and the 1.5 million domains with valid certificates owned by someone else. Domains change hands but certificates don’t know. The old owner keeps their private key, and the certificate keeps working. It’s an industry problem, but it turns out it’s our problem too. We purchased certkit.dev for internal development and demos.

Your servers shouldn't need to know ACME

CertBot assumes every server that needs a certificate should also know how to request one, validate domain ownership, handle renewals, and manage failures. This makes sense with a handful of servers. One server, one cert, done. But infrastructures grow. Now you’ve got web farms sharing wildcards, load balancers, mail servers, VPN appliances. The “every server for itself” model doesn’t scale and isn’t sustainable. Even the Let’s Encrypt community knows it.